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China is poised to become one of the dominant economic forces in the world and today with 
the ability to affect the financial stability of every country in an interconnected global system 
of trade and finance. This study was conducted to understand what incentives, structural and 
social and political phenomena shaped the competitive dynamics leading to meteoric economic 
growth in China. Cities and clusters is where state and market forces interact most directly; to 
understand key insights, patterns of growth, future risks and opportunities we decided to focus 
the analysis on the case of Shenzhen, China’s fastest-growing, experimental city. Since there 
are numerous theories and frameworks to understand competitive dynamics, we created a three-
layered conceptual taxonomy of 16 index variables based on salient aspects that emerged from 
an extensive literature review. To gain further qualitative understanding of the proposed 
conceptual model, we conducted a survey distributed to people living and working in Shenzhen 
and China. The research found the major causal factor for extraordinary economic growth was 
central and local government adaptive efficiency which ushered in reforms and capital 
injections from Beijing. Shenzhen is a striking example of successful competitive dynamics 
and market-oriented reforms. However, factors like the debt burden, lack of transparency, 
corruption within institutions and fragile foreign affairs are likely to impact the long-term 
competitive sustainability. 
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A China está prestes a se tornar uma das forças econômicas dominantes no mundo e hoje pode 
afetar a estabilidade financeira de cada país. Este estudo foi realizado para entender que 
incentivos, estruturais, sociais e políticos moldaram a dinâmica competitiva levando ao 
crescimento econômico meteórico na China. Cidades e clusters é onde as forças do estado e do 
mercado interagem mais diretamente; para entender os principais padrões de insights de 
crescimento, riscos futuros e oportunidades, decidimos focar a análise no caso de Shenzhen, a 
cidade experimental e de crescimento mais rápido da China. Já que já existe um número imenso 
de teorias e frameworks para entender a dinâmica competitiva, criamos um sistema de 
taxonomia conceitual de três camadas composto por um conjunto de 16 variáveis de índice com 
base em aspetos salientes emergidos pela extensa revisão da literatura. Além disso, para obter 
insights qualitativos do modelo conceitual proposto, realizamos uma pesquisa distribuída às 
pessoas que vivem e trabalham em Shenzhen e na China. A pesquisa concluiu que o grande 
crescimento econômico foi impulsionado pela eficiência adaptativa do governo central e local, 
abrindo reformas e injeções de capital em Pequim. Através da evolução mostrada por suas 
variáveis econômicas, Shenzhen é um exemplo marcante da realização de uma dinâmica 
competitiva bem-sucedida e de uma reforma orientada para o mercado.  No entanto, 
desvantagens como o peso da dívida, a transparência e a corrupção das instituições e a 
fragilidade dos negócios estrangeiros são suscetíveis de impactar a sustentabilidade a longo 
prazo do país. 
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This dissertation is an intrinsic type of case study (Stake, 1995) which focuses on the 
competitive dynamics that shaped Chinese economic growth. The work concentrates on 
analysis of cities and clusters, in particular, the case of Shenzhen. According with the literature, 
case studies aim to explore individuals or organizations, through complex interventions, 
relationships, or programs and support the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of 
various phenomena using a variety of data sources (Yin et al., 1985). The purpose of this paper 
is to explore the different manifestations of competitiveness in China and consequently answer 
the following research questions: 
1. What incentives, structural, social and political phenomena have shaped the competitive 
dynamics leading to meteoric economic growth in China? 
2. How do China’s fundamental institutions structure shape the business landscape? 
3. What is driving all the changes in patterns of growth and structure and how cities and 
clusters are enabling global scale? 
4. Why Shenzhen can be a proxy for understanding macro factors peculiar of the Chinese 
economic growth? 
To address these questions, the study is organized into four sections. This introductory section 
sets the contexts, asks the research questions and introduces the organization of the paper. The 
second part presents an extensive literature review about the concept of competitiveness, 
narrowing into the meaning of this term for China. The third section is the core of the paper, 
presents the case study of Shenzhen, and includes three sub-sections: study area, methodology 
and analysis of data. Next, the fourth section, concludes the article and suggests limitations of 
this study and thematic strands of further research. 
 
1.1 Significance of the topic 
 
China is poised to become the dominant economic force in the world. Internal dynamics have 
made it possible for the country to become at the heart of the global supply chain and will 
enhance its sustainable growth. China became the world’s largest economy in terms of 
purchasing-power- parity terms in 2014, is a global power in scale, but not always in global 
integration. Despite China’s opening and relaxation policies, operational and regulatory 
complexities in China’s financial markets remain a constraint for international players. China’s 
disclosure to the world in trade, technology, and capital has plunged in relative terms.  





Conversely, the world’s exposure to China has increased. This reflects the readjusting of the 
Chinese economy toward domestic consumption, as the majority of Chinese enterprises’ 
revenue still comes from the home economy (Woetzel et al., 2019). The Mainland opening and 
reforms have offered economies of the rest of the world huge benefits, indeed, consumers 
benefited from lower and accessible prices thanks to Chinese imports and international firms 
have tapped into new sources of growth (Woetzel et al., 2019). As far as trade is concerned, 
China in the last ten years has become one of the major players in terms of both supplier and 
market; the country exports in 33 countries and it’s a very attractive source of imports with 
more than 65 countries importing in the Mainland. In terms of capital, even if the country is the 
world’s second-largest source of outbound FDI and recipient of inbound FDI, its financial 
system still is far from globalized. Moving towards a consumer market-based economy and 
with consumers’ purchasing behavior shifting towards e-commerce, the country has the highest 
percentage of internet users in the world generating an incredible amount of data, however the 
use of the information gathered is still limited to the country level, with cross-border data flow 
very low compared to the US. Also, the country has the world largest number of outgoing 
students and largest outbound travel market for in terms of both trips and expenditures. Factors 
such as higher income and friendlier visa policy encouraged the Chinese people to travel, indeed 
outbound trips are expected to reach 160 million by 2020 (Woetzel et al., 2019).





2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. About competitiveness  
 
The term ‘competitiveness’ originated from the Latin prefix ‘con’ meaning together and the 
Latin word ‘petere’ meaning to seek, attack, aim at, desire (Siudek and Zawojska, 2014).  
In the literature, authors’ definitions of competitiveness range from those considering a nation’s 
competitiveness from the macro-perspective (the classical approach) to those concentrating on 
firms or farms, thus looking at competitiveness in micro-economic terms (the neoclassical 
approach) (Siudek and Zawojska, 2014). 
 
In accordance with Porter (2003) competition is defined as one of society’s most impressive 
powers for improving conditions in numerous fields of human undertaking.  The concept of 
competitiveness is hard to define and lacks a universally accepted definition; It usually refers 
to a country’s performance, defined by a set of indices like inflation, unemployment rate, 
growth and living standards (Lawrence, 2002). Furthermore, it can be applied to individual 
products or services, enterprises, industries, economic sectors, regions, nations or international 
economic blocks. Competitive indicators that measure competitiveness can help define the 
concept in each of the mentioned areas (Siudek and Zawojska, 2014).  
 
According to Marginean (2006), we can distinguish between micro and macroeconomic 
interpretations of the concept. At the macroeconomic level, she identified at least three ways to 
see competitiveness: Competitiveness as productivity; Competitiveness as capacity to create 
welfare; Competitiveness as ability to sell on external markets (Marginean, 2006).   
To cite some popular definitions in the literature, touching on productivity, we can mention 
Krugman (1994) who stated that, if competitiveness has any meaning, it is simply just another 
way to express productivity. The capacity of a nation to improve its quality of life depends 
mostly on its capacity to increase its productivity (Krugman, 1994). 
 
Michael Porter and the World Economic Forum define national competitiveness as a set of 
factors, policies and institutions that determine the level of the productivity of a country. 
Raising productivity - meaning making better use of the resources – is the driving force behind 
the rates of return on investment which, in turn, determine the aggregate growth rate of an 
economy. (Global Competitiveness Report, 2007). This adhere to the WEF definition that 





suggested that competitiveness composed by institutions, reforms and variables that can 
enhance the productivity of a nation (Schwab et al., 2018). 
 
Recently, ex-ECB President Mario Draghi, defined a competitive economy as one in which 
“institutional and macroeconomic conditions allow productive firms to thrive and in turn, the 
development of these firms supports the expansion of employment, investment  and trade” 
(quoted in Altomonte and Bekes, 2016). This productivity–oriented view of competitiveness 
uses as a measure of competitiveness the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by 
Jeffrey Sachs and John McArthur in 2001. The 2002 World Economic Forum published the 
annual report on Global Competitiveness where we can find rankings related to Global 
Competitiveness Index, Growth Competitiveness Index, etc. (Schwab, 2019).  
 
The second dimension highlighted by Marginean, (2006) is competitiveness as capacity to 
create welfare. In 1971, Bobba et al., defined competitiveness as the capacity of nations, regions 
and companies to produce wealth being the prequisite for high wages.  
Many specialists argue that standards of living are a meaningful measure of  competitiveness at 
macroeconomic level (Marginean, 2006). The definition proposed by European 
Competitiveness Reports is the key element for this interpretation of competitiveness: in the 
EC view, competitiveness is understood to mean high and rising standards of living of a nation 
or a group of nations with the lowest possible level of involuntary unemployment, on a 
sustainable basis (Balkytė and Tvaronavičienė, 2010). Interest in competitiveness increases 
particularly in countries and regions that are performing relative poorly compared to other 
geographical zones (Marginean, 2006). This suggests a close link between the meaning of 
competitiveness and the ability of an economy to create wealth for its citizens compared to 
other economies. The interpretation of competitiveness as ability to create welfare has to 
include an “outcome assessment” and a “process assessment” (Aiginger, 2006). The definition 
of ‘outcome competitiveness’ as the welfare of a nation correlates with per capita income, 
employment, distributional, social and ecological goals. The definition of ‘process 
competitiveness’ refers to processes and capabilities generating competitiveness. 
 
The third dimension, according to Marginean, (2006), is the ability to sell in a market: the main 
rival to productivity/base definition of competitiveness is the market–share based definition. It 
defines competitiveness as the ability to sell on international markets and is fundamentally 
concerned with the sustainability of an economy’s overall external balance. In this view, 





competitiveness is a country’s share of world markets for its products. This makes 
competitiveness a zero-sum game, since one nation's benefit comes to the detriment of another 
(Porter, 2003). Exports can result from subsidies or other incentives provided, for instance by 
exchange rate misalignment. Such incentives can explain the growth of the country’s share of 
the world market, but this is not based on Ricardian comparative advantage. Real 
competitiveness and nominal competitiveness are two different ways to achieve a better 
position in the world trade. 
 
According to Delgado et al. (2012), building on the economic development literature, there 
exist two broad dimensions of macroeconomic competitiveness -- social infrastructure and 
political institutions (SIPI), and monetary and fiscal policy (MFP).  
 
First, SIPI includes basic health and education, the quality of political institutions, and the rule 
of law. In recent years, a number of important analyses have identified such institutions and 
their long-term impact as a crucial source of disparity in productivity and wealth across nations 
(E.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).  
 
The second broad dimension of macroeconomic competitiveness is MFP, which includes 
measures of fiscal sustainability and debt and inflation policies for managing short and medium-
term fluctuations of economic activity (E.g., Fischer, 1993). While it has a clear impact on 
short-term economic activity, the literature finds only weak effects on long-term productivity 
differences. By and large, existing evidence shows that competition and a well -crafted 
competition policy framework can help to improve welfare and other macroeconomic outcomes 
(Dutz and Hayri, 1999; Strahan and Cadell, 2004; Aghion and Griffith, 2005). From a policy 
viewpoint, SIPI and MFP are commonly designated or largely affected by the national regime 
(Delgado et al., 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the literature presents many studies regarding the microeconomic foundation 
of competitiveness (Şeyda and Cüreoğlu, 2013).  
 
According to Porter “the competitiveness of a nation has microeconomic foundations” (Porter, 
2003). Most debates on competitiveness and economic advancement dealt with 
macroeconomic, political, legal, and social issues yet these circumstances are fundamental but 
not sufficient as they serve as an opportunity to create wealth, but they do not actually create 





wealth. Wealth is indeed built at microeconomic levels of the economy, grounded in the poise 
of firms as well as in the nature of the microeconomic business environment in which a nation’s 
companies compete. Therefore, the macroeconomic, political, legal, and social reforms will not 
bloom unless microeconomic conditions improve (Porter, 2003). Microeconomic determinants 
of competitiveness are very distinct phenomena.  
 
Going beyond comprehensive institutional factors, microeconomic competitiveness is 
grounded on specific characteristics of the domestic business environment ( e.g., whether 
business policies improve or hinder investment and development), the arrangement of 
economic activity (e.g., the degree of local competition and the magnitude of congestion from 
cluster development), and the adoption of advanced business management approaches ( e.g., 
whether firms use fiscal stimulus). Porter (1990) was one of the first academic to pinpoint the 
role of microeconomic variables in shaping the productivity and wealth of a country. 
 
A significant body of empirical evidence now emphasizes the role of microeconomic policies, 
structure and practices in national and regional economic performance (among others, 
Dertouzos, et al, 1989; Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998, 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; 
Bloom et al., 2009; Freeman and Shaw, 2009; Delgado et al., 2010).  
 
Microeconomic variables have the capacity to affect both firm’s productivity and workforce 
mobilization (Delgado et al., 2012). Microeconomic concepts and indicators of competitiveness 
have a solid theoretical base because they focus on the essential characteristics of producers in 
competition for market share and profits or ability to export. This ability can be measured by 
the size or increase of market share, performance, price ratios, cost competitiveness or by 
multidimensional indicators (Siggel, 2006). 
 
In the literature there is evidence of three broad and interrelated drivers of competitiveness: 
social infrastructure and political institutions, monetary and fiscal policy, and the 
microeconomic environment (Delgado et al., 2012) 
 
However, none of these approaches is satisfactory today because of the increasing importance 
that innovation plays in both advanced and developing countries in creating and sustaining 
competitiveness (Distanont and Khongmalai, 2018). 
 





Competitiveness can be seen as the result of a constant innovation process that enables firms to 
catch up and keep up in terms of technology as the mode of competition changes. (Mytelka, 
1999). In order to understand how competitiveness in the developing countries is created and 
sustained it is important to further analyze the elements that enhance the innovating process.  
 
Understanding how competitiveness is created and sustained in developing countries requires 
a deeper analysis of factors pertaining to the innovating process within firms in those countries. 
In sum, one cannot assume linearity in the relationship between competition and 
competitiveness. Instead, as the above analysis illustrates, the link between these two processes 
is intermediated by other factors that affect innovation. 
 
Mytelka (1999) assumes that since competition in the current context of globalization is 
increasingly innovation-based, it is important for technological ‘latecomers’ to integrate 
innovation into the relationship between competition and competitiveness. Her study 
demonstrates the importance of continuous innovation over time for latecomers in how and 
what they produce, so costs decline, and quality constantly improves. Latecomers thus n eed 
policies to stimulate development of appropriate management and organizational techniques, 
as well as development of a domestic science and technology base.  
 
An inspiring approach to the competitiveness is offered by Schumpeter (1934) in his theories 
of the entrepreneur and innovation stating that the mere capability of creating innovations and 
an owner’s entrepreneurial activities determine the firm’s competitive advantage. A company’s 
ability to innovate is, therefore, key for achieving competitive advantage over rivals. The ability 
to create new solutions and a disposition for risk-taking undergirds the competition process and 
entrepreneurship. Differences in the level of innovative capacity and entrepreneurship explain 
differences in competitive positions of any economic agent (Karlsson et al., 2019). 
 
2.2. Competitiveness in China 
 
The source of China’s Competitiveness since 1979 has been her declining transaction costs. 
These are costs that hinder or facilitate mutually beneficial trade among people across time and 
space and the costs of maintaining and changing institutions and incentives for trade, 
investment, and growth. Indeed, competitiveness can be seen as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  1 / (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 +  𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) 





where factor costs depend on supply and demand conditions while transaction costs depend on 
institutions, institutional change and technology (Geng, 2019).  
 
According to the Nobel Laureate in economics Douglass C. North, institutional change is the 
admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics that shape 
economic performance. Also, politics significantly shape economic performance because they 
define and enforce economic rules (North, 2008). 
 
Geng (2019) argues that China’s institutions address economic, social and environmental 
challenges and have driven its rapid growth since the late 1970s. Indeed, a proper understanding 
of China’s institutions and reform processes is crucial to any analysis of the country’s rapid 
development. Within its rapidly changing dynamics, the Chinese political system is 
characterized by its ability to respond and adapt, implementing the institutional innovations and 
policy reforms required to meet changing problems and needs (Ahlers, 2014). Accordingly, 
Tsai (2006) adopted the term “adaptive informal institutions” to describe the actions undertaken 
by Chinese officials. Geng et al., (2015) claim that looking at the matrix of China’s institutions, 
we can understand China’s competitive dynamics. Institutional changes and economic 
performances in China are characterized by adaptive efficiency. The drivers of this are the state -
market dynamics, the central-local/SOE dynamics and the global governance-sovereign states 
dynamics. The matrix of relationships among institutions, also called the “tiáo-tiáo kuài-kuài” 
– literally, “lines and pieces”, is formed by the tiáo-tiáo which refers to the vertical lines of 
control from the central government through national organs to local-level institutions. They 
include central planning concerning development and reform; the nomination and promotion 
of officials to important posts in ministries, state-owned enterprises, and local governments at 
all levels; and macroeconomic tools, particularly fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate, and 
regulatory policies. The other element, the kuài-kuài refers to the lateral, highly competitive 
relationships among regional entities, to which the central government delegates a certain 
amount of autonomy. In order to achieve genuine stability, China’s leaders have always strived 
to find a delicate balance between tiáo-tiáo control and kuài-kuài autonomy.  
 
Kuài-kuài is the competitive market of local governments: China’s economic mechanism 
largely depends on local-government competition as this complement market rivalries between 
companies. Competition occurs horizontally in which entities with similar responsibilities 
compete on the same level (Cheung, 2009). Local politicians compete for two main reasons. 





On one hand, the bureaucratic-promotion structure drives officials to seek economic growth 
through successful reforms. On the other hand, officials pursue strong economic moves to 
increase their prestige and responsibility external to the promotion structure (Geng et al., 2015).  
 
Clearly, local governments play an important role in China’s economic growth as they are 
directly involved in the economy and have significant autonomy and freedom of action within 
their jurisdictions (Yang, 1994; Oi, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1996; Yep, 2004; Unger and Chan 2008; 
Saich and Hu 2012). Oi (1995) uses the term “local state corporation” to emphasize how local 
governments treat local enterprises as key elements of their administrative provinces that are 
sources of growth for the country. Local government authorities are both market participants 
and drivers of development and competition. The interaction between the state and the market 
also occurs in cities, where needs and challenges produce local innovations that can then be 
implemented on a larger and politically effective scale. Local government competition creates 
strong incentives and constraints for officials to foster productivity and create value by 
deploying market’s resources, capital and talent and to avoid rent-seeking and corrupt behavior 
that does not create new wealth. Therefore, this local competition stimulates innovation that, in 
turn, supports achieving country-wide goals. Local governments, contrary to western 
economies behave like firms, yet with a strong exposure to moral hazards. (Geng et al., 2015).  
 
Tiáotiáo describes how although, local competition may be a fundamental element of China’s 
economic dynamism, proper supervision and direction is also crucial. This is the task 
undertaken by tiáotiáo institutions which are the basic means of central control. Central 
government is in charge of policymaking and administration, party control, national planning, 
fiscal relationships and market regulation. The sophisticated interaction that ti áo-kuài play 
builds an unconventional combination of long-term policy commitment and institutionalized 
policy experimentation (Xu, 2010). 
 
This competition between local governments, guided and constrained by central control, is the 
fulcrum of the institutional model of China’s political economy. The tiáo-kuài mechanisms 
create political frictions that improves institutions.  How accurately private-sector markets 
operate is, in turn, determined by the quality of those institutions (Xu, 2010). 
 
According to a large body of literature, competition and a well-crafted competitive policy 
framework can help improve welfare and other macroeconomic outcomes (Dutz and Hayri 





1999; Strahan and Cadell, 2004; Aghion and Griffith 2005; OECD 2014). The WEF (2019) 
placed China at number 28 in the global competitive index, its ranking unchanged from the 
previous year. Its score increased by 1.3 points, characterized by an important rise in ICT 
adoption (78.5, 18th). China is the best performer among the BRIC economies and the country’s 
assets, including the size of its market (both the domestic and export markets), and 
macroeconomic stability, rank it 98.8 and 39th. In several areas, China’s performance aligns 
with OECD standards. For instance, China exceeds 25 OECD countries in ICT adoption. Life 
expectancy is 1.5 years longer than in the United States and only 0.8 years shorter than the 
OECD average. Infrastructure is also a strength (77.9, 36th) and the country has been rapidly 
increasing its innovation capability (64.8, 24 th) (Schwab, 2019). 
 
Aburaki (2013) argued that the true nature and scope of China’s competitiveness is in key 
technology areas, as well as the current state of China’s economic policies. The country has 
also adequately used competition among individuals, companies, cities, and provincial 
administrations to make sure that all stakeholders grant to productivity and GDP growth (Geng 
and Sheng, 2018). 
 
Until now, China’s achievement was based on constructive competition between local 
governments and different departments, benchmarked according to performance indicators 
such as GDP and fiscal revenues. Unfortunately, this has led to problems of social inequity and 
environmental sustainability, which require complex coordination between siloed 
bureaucracies to overcome resistance from powerful vested interests (Geng and Sheng, 2012).  
Competition-fueled growth, occurring across multiple dimensions between market and non-
market actors, has propelled China emerging as the world’s second-largest economy. But this 
is unsustainable. The imperative now is to recalibrate competitive forces to address the array of 
negative externalities caused by state and market activities that harm citizens’ interests (Geng 
and Sheng, 2014). 
 
2.3. Characteristics of cities and clusters in China 
 
From the reform era that began in 1978 (Garnaut et al., 2018), China’s cities became 
institutionally important and more independent in terms of economic planning and 
management. From the 90s, local governments started to be considered as proper entities with 





not only social and governance responsibilities, but also in charge of local government 
financing vehicles (I.e. infrastructure projects) (Garnaut et al., 2018).  
 
At the same time, the centralized hukou1 system created a regime of migrant workers providing 
a cheap and captive labor force for factories in cities. China’s economic miracle is largely 
predicated upon a labor arbitrage whereby cheap labor and higher productivity would turn 
China into the manufacturer of first and last resort in the global economy (Cheng and Selden, 
1994). Residents were divided into urban ‘hukou’ holders and agricultural ones. This resident 
permit system restricted heavily migration; however, in the 90s relaxation of policy and reforms 
permitted migration flow more freely allowing the urbanization process. Rural to urban 
migration increased dramatically during the first ten years of the twenty-first century, although 
the system has been largely relaxed, limitations still exists and mirror into some social factors 
such as relative income and educational levels. Since about 2003, policy-makers have 
implemented measures and policies to abolish this traditional dualistic system; most substantial 
steps have been the reduction of ‘ urban bias ’ to raise rural compensation, the encouragement 
of migration, combined with loosening of urban residence permit system (“New-Style 
Urbanization) and the strengthening farmer property rights in land (Chan, K. W., 2019).  
 
The centralized command economy has created a level of uniformity across cities in terms of 
infrastructure and production capacities. But since regulations, policies and institutions are 
locally managed, different outcomes and growth paradigms also arise. Researchers have sought 
to understand the development trajectories of different cities and analyze how the balance 
between people, profit and planet can be rendered more sustainable. (Geng et al., 2015).  
 
Geng et al. (2015) argue that cities represent the locus where state-market dynamics interact 
most explicitly. Urban studies offer insights on China’s growth model pertaining to past, present 
and future risks and opportunities as they explicitly affect market, social, institutional and 
economic activities. Cities drive business and household activities and push local and central 
governments to be more responsive to economic, socio-political and environmental factors. 
China’s municipal areas comprise of more than 300 autonomous entities that behave like small 
 
1 Hukou is a system of household registration used in mainland China. Until very recently, each citizen was classified in an 
agricultural or non-agricultural hukou (commonly referred to as rural or urban) and further categorized by location of origin 
(Cheng and Selden, 1994). 
 





states, controlling and managing resources to optimize economic, industrial and urban 
development.  
 
A major driver of the growth of cities is the continuous development of economic specialization 
caused and sustained by urbanization processes. (Turok and Mcgranahan, 2013). 
Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Krugman (1991) explain that concentrations of economic activity 
can result in endogenous and scalable increases in efficiency, thus attracting human capital 
which is positively correlated with productivity and crucial for a city’s development (Rosen, 
1983). Not only human capital, but also infrastructure and sector-specific institutions are 
requisites for a city’s long-term development (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Rodrik, et al, 2004; 
Rodrik, 2007; Saxenian, 1994; Becattini, 1990). Several studies highlight the positive 
externalities generated by clusters that promote economic growth such as the talent pool, 
infrastructure development and innovation capacity. These positive outcomes are driven and 
sustained by the critical role played by political and social institutions and effective policies. 
Also, local measures and development successes influence regional and, in turn, national 
growth and innovation. (Best, 1990; Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sable, 1984; Morgan and Sayer, 
1988; Scott, 1993; Wolfe and Gertler, 1998). 
 
As Porter (1998) outlined competitiveness depends on improving knowledge and creativity 
through clusters. This view aligns with theories from the “endogenous school” concerning 
regional development which points out that clusters are organized and independent entities that 
create and sustain competitive advantage through coordinated efforts (Courlet and Soulage, 
1995; Garofoli, 2002; Lawson and Lorenz, 1999; Mailat, 1998).  
 
According to Mytelka and Farinelli (2000), clusters can be developed into two ways; the first 
is when clusters emerge in a spontaneous way due to geographical proximity of group of 
interconnected and different parties. The second way is when clusters are inducted, thus 
designed by policy makers to   promote industrial development, innovation, competitiveness 
and growth. Clusters in general, can be characterized by innovation systems, mainly explicated 
in three forms (learning, linkage and investment) that help develop and sustain activities of 
different actors of the cluster (Mytelka, 2000).  
 
This innovation-system process is based on three cluster-related elements. First, clusters 
enhance and deepen local understanding. This is enhanced by including design, quality controls 





and marketing. Second, clusters stimulate deepening of learning inputs. Finally, clusters are 
capable of transforming low tech industries into pools filled with tacit knowledge that yield 
competitive advantage. This knowledge transferability within an individual cluster stimulates 
investment and growth in innovation. Clusters thus align with Schumpeter’s notion of 
entrepreneurs being the driving force behind competitiveness (Schumpeter, 1934). Clusters 
offer market opportunities and favorable conditions for entrepreneurial activities, stimulating 
innovation and improving productivity (Meier Zu Koecker, 2016).  
 
Reducing transaction costs is crucial for China’s evolving growth model (Geng, 2019). Clusters 
create solid vertical relationships between different actors (i.e. suppliers and users) that reduce 
costs, risks and time to market associated with new products or innovation (Lundvall, 1988; 
Lundvall, 1992; Ernst et al., 1998, Nelson, 1993). At the same time, horizontal links between 
small and medium enterprises of the same industry generate ‘collaborative efficiency’ 
(Schmitz, 1995). Location advantages play an important role for cluster development (Best, 
1990; Camagni, 1986; Piore and Sable, 1984; Tolomelli, 1990; Saxenian, 1994).  
 
A national economy is an aggregation of regional ones. Its strength depends on the 
competitiveness of each sector. Several studies detail the positive relationship between GDP 
per capita and cluster concentrations, as well as cluster strength and wage levels in clusters 
(Mills et al., 2008). 
 
According to Geng and Sheng (2018), Between 1978 and 2012, China’s impressive GDP 
growth allowed the country to lift more than 500 million people out of poverty. Data shows that 
the top 100 cities employ roughly 53% of the total population and generated 75.7% of China’s 
GDP in 2016. The national average GDP growth of 6.7% has been outpaced by six of those 100 
cities, reaching more than 10% annual GDP growth. Furthermore, in 33 Chinese cities, per 
capita GDP is at a ‘high income’ level (using the World Bank standards). 
 
Defined areas or clusters are distinguished by the presence of several smart cities. The major 
ones are the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), the Pearl River Delta (PRD), and the Beijing- Tianjin-
Hebei cluster (BTH). By 2014, the PRD had expanded into the Greater Bay Area (GBA), 
covering nine cities around the PRD in Southern Guangdong, among them Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou plus Hong Kong and Macau. China is currently working towards the creation of 19 
supercity clusters, by tightening links among cities. Those clusters are projected to account for 





about 80% of the country’s total GDP by 2030. These clusters will not only facilitate economic 
growth but will be crucial in addressing structural social challenges such as inequality, pollution 
and excess capacity. The PRD’s competitiveness is mainly due to Deng Xiaoping reforms 
which transformed the region and to the technological progress which drove down transaction 
costs, improving market efficiencies through more rational resource allocation. (Kamal-Chaoui 
et al., 2009).





3. Case Study of Shenzhen 
 
3.1. Study Area  
 
The research focuses on a selected coastal city located in South China in Guangdong province, 
adjacent to Hong Kong, Shenzhen. The dramatic economic growth of China enabled the country 
to become the second largest economy of the world and undoubtedly, cities and clusters have  
played and still play a crucial role in spurring and sustaining competitive dynamism.  
 
Among them, the most important is the Pearl River Delta, by 2014, the PRD had morphed into 
the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, that comprises the Hong Kong and 
Macao special administrative regions and the nine cities of the Guangdong province, among 
them Shenzhen. Promoting the advancement of the Greater Bay Area is a notable decision made 
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) under the leadership of 
Comrade Xi Jinping and facilitated the province to become the biggest contributor to Chinese 
GDP (Upton, 2019).  
 
Shenzhen is the fastest-growing experimental city that developed from an angling village into 
a global city in 40 years, it is nowadays known as the 'China's Silicon Valley'.  The city of 
Shenzhen was set up in 1979, the following year, it was home for the first Special Economic 
Zone and in December 2018 Shenzhen Special Cooperation Zone was authoritatively 
established. The city was planned as a national pilot city for thorough transformation and 
reforms. The administration of Shenzhen has effectively determined its own changes of 
functions and fortified the development of a service-oriented government. The city under the 
guidance of building a law-based, mindful and effective government, has improved its 
regulatory transparency and management efficiency, so as to give a reasonable, straightforward, 
productive and law-based environment for the advancement of the general public and welfare 
of the residents. The government rejected the ‘one-size fits all’ approach and implemented the 
so called ‘BREEP methodology’ (browse, research, experiment, evaluate and push forward) 
enabling flexible and responsive reforms; therefore, Shenzhen started to lead the pack in 
completing the market-oriented reform of the economic system. The city has advanced in more 
than 1,000 unique fields in the nation, from building the primary export-oriented economic 
development zone in China to holding China's first land sell off, from taking the lead in 
"bringing in" to "going worldwide” and to implementing comprehensive reforms in economic, 





political, cultural, social, ecological civilization and Party building systems. Shenzhen keeps 
on creating a world-class business environment to enormously animate the market vitality. It is 
the national economic, science and innovation center, regional financial, commercial and 
logistics heart. Shenzhen today has achieved efficiency in specialization, and it is a proxy for 




a. Concept framework and index variables  
The approach is qualitative and descriptive, the intent is not to try constructing another index 
of city competitiveness, several are already available; rather this study analyses the state of 
Chinese competitiveness and the pursuit for a competitive Shenzhen from macro, micro and 
innovation perspectives, drawing upon the international competitiveness literature (part II). The 
report then provides a definition of city competitiveness and creates a simple taxonomy of four 
drivers of competitiveness. It is really hard to evaluate the overall level of a city’s 
competitiveness by only a single indicator; indeed, we developed an index system that covers 
all the aspects of the city’s competitiveness. Therefore, the taxonomy system we developed is 
divided into three main levels, as shown in Table 1. The first level (level A) analyses the macro - 
and micro- factors that characterize competitiveness. The second level (level B), investigates 
external factors peculiar of the Chinese government matrix: social infrastructure and political 
institutions (SIPI), and monetary and fiscal policy (MFP). The third level (level C) covers the 
innovative and technological elements that enhance the competitiveness of a city.  
 
Table 1. Competitive Framework 
SC2 Level A – Macro & Micro 
- GDP growth rates 
- Labour market statistics 
- FDI 
- Wages, income levels 
- House Prices 
- Market characteristic 
- Exports/global trade 
- Basic Infrastructure 
 
2 SC = Shenzhen Competitiveness 





Level B – SIPI and MFP 
- Social infrastructure and political institutions 
- Fiscal and monetary policy 
Level C – Innovation 
- ICT adoption 
- Environmental level  
- Innovation capability 
- Entrepreneurial culture 
- Patents 
- R&D levels 
Source: Author 
 
In addition to secondary research, we decided to carry out an empirical analysis of the proposed 
conceptual model based on the survey instrument. The survey consisted of 18 questions and 2 
matrix table type of questions where the respondents had to answer with a 7-point Lickert scale. 
The aim was to gain a qualitative understanding of competition from an internal perspective 
thus from people living and working in Shenzhen and China in general.  
 
b. Data sample and processing  
There are mainly three data sources in this study. The first two sources are annual statistical 
reports, statistical yearbooks and networks, published by accredited statistical institutions, both 
at the state and city level; the last source is the published reports and research data from 
international statistical institutions or companies. The statistical data ranges from 1979 to 2018. 
Because of the existence of missing data for certain indicators in certain years, different year 
ranges have been considered for the analysis of a particular index for a specific purpose. After 
having collected sufficient data sources, scientific methods were conducted to further analyze 
patterns in order to enable the purpose of the research. In accordance with the research 
objectives, the data should explain the characteristics and determinants that enabled the creation 
and growth of Shenzhen.  
 
Concerning the empirical analysis, the survey was distributed to a sample of 200 Chinese 
citizens. Participants were given a link to fill out anonymously. The amount of finished surveys 
was 144; respondents not living in China (24%) have not been taken into account, as not 
significant for the scope of the research. Given the 109 relevant responses, the 79,3% of 
participants either live in Shenzhen or own a business there, while the remaining in other cities 





of China. The 60% of the respondents are employed, 82,7% employed by Private sector and 
for‐profit organization, 5,8 % by Nonprofit organization and 11,5% by public sector or 
government organization. 96,7% of respondents stated that their firm is exposed to international 
competition and their firms belong for the majority to one of the following sectors: Wholesale 
and Retail Trade, Educational, Financial and professional services.  
 
In this context, the reliability of data might be not reasonably accurate and subject to 
inappropriate alteration, as the government data contains errors and biases, which is not unique 
to China, and has been a cause for concern among scholars. Accordingly, a study carried out 
by Koch-Weser (2013), concludes that China’s official statistics are not as reliable as those 
produced in the United States and Europe because there are serious deficiencies in the way the 
Chinese government gathers, measures, and presents its data. This is also common knowledge 
as the Chinese population is very concerned about the concept of “Saving face” or “面子” 
(mianzi) that refers to a sociological concept that links the ideas of honor, dignity, self -worth 
and prestige that a person feels when in social situations. 
 
3.3. The analysis of Shenzhen’ competitiveness 
 
a. Level A – Macro & Micro  
Looking at the trajectories of the main indicators of national economic accounting, is clear that 
Shenzhen’s evolution pattern is very unique. Starting from an impressive grow of the 
population that shifted from 330.000 to 13.000.000 over forty years, we can notice positive 
trends in macroeconomic variables such as employment rate. Indeed, the number of employed 
persons increased by 6953,4% and the GDP trend over the years from 1979 to 2018 followed 
an exponential curve, increasing by 1233324% (Appendix: Figures 10 and 11). Figure 1 shows 
the correlation between the number of employed persons and the Gross Domestic Product Per 
Capita: as the R2 value is close to 1, we can state that the relationship between the variables is 
positive, thus an increase in number of employed persons correlates with an increase in GDP 
per capita. Another useful economic indicator is the real estate appreciation over a time frame, 
Figure 2 illustrates the rise of house prices over 20 years in Shenzhen, increasing by 813% to 
54090¥ per square meter in 2018.  
 
 





Figure 1. Correlation between number of employed persons and GDP  
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
Figure 2. Average Selling Price of Commercial houses in Shenzhen, 1998-2018
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
A corollary of the urbanization boom is the demand for a strong infrastructure system. This 
pushed officials to find creative solutions mainly in roads, ports and telco networks. Shenzhen, 
adjacent to Hong Kong, enjoys unique geographical advantages. It is a significant t ransportation 
hub in the Asia-Pacific region under the Belt and Road Initiative. The city also boasts of the 
international deep-water port, a large international airport, the largest land port, important 
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expressways, national railways and passenger lines. Shenzhen ranks top in terms of the subway 
comprehensiveness by China Urban Cities’ Transit-Oriented Development Index Report and 
ranks Fourth in the World Container Port with its large throughput in 2018. The favorable 
geographical position and the positive trend of economic indicators enabled the city to become 
a strategic player for the changing relationship between China and the rest of the world, helping 
to create engagement with foreign investors and global integration.  
 
If we look at the market characteristics and the transformation of the industry, we can notice 
China's transition from a planned economy to a more market-based economy. Figure 3 
graphically illustrates the changing composition of key industries in Shenzhen from 1979 to 
2018.  
 
Figure 3. The Changing composition of key industries in Shenzhen, 1979 - 2018 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
In 2019, the primary sector accounted only for 0.1% g the GDP with an added value of RMB 
2.21 billion, the secondary industry explained 41.2% of the GDP with an added value of RMB 
996.19 billion and the tertiary market accounted for 58.7% of the GDP with an added value of 
RMB 1,423.79 billion. Key industries today in Shenzhen are high-tech, finance, logistics and 
culture related. Shenzhen’s key industries are crucial for attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and supporting foreign trade. The changing economic structure has developed an export-
oriented economy and Shenzhen in 2019 became the No.1 export city for 26 consecutive years 
with a total foreign trade import and export value of USD447.8 billion (RMB 3 trillion). The 
Growth rate of Exports in 2018 increased by 10% from 2016 and the Total Value of Exports 
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positive trend with a minor magnitude increasing from USD7.4 million in 1979 to USD207 
billion in 2018 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4. Growth rate and total value of exports, 1979 - 2018 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
Figure 5. Total Exports and Imports, 1979 - 2017 
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FDI has made a tremendous contribution to Shenzhen’s industrialization, the increasing inflows 
of capital reached the value USD161 billion in 2018, with the amount of FDI actually utilized 
of USD8 billion (Table 2).  In recent years, most foreign capital has gone to the service industry, 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of foreign capital grouped by sector over the last 30 years (1988 
– 2018).  
 
Table 2. Foreign direct capital actually utilized and growth rate 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
Figure 6. Actually utilized foreign capital by sector, 1998 - 2018 
 



















































































Actually Utilized Foreign Capital by Sector, 1988 - 2018
information technology and scientific research
Financial and leasing and business
Others
Real estate
 Transportation,Storage,Postal and Telecommunications Services
Wholesale and Retail Sales, Accommodation and Catering Services
Industry
Year 1979 1989 1999 2009 2018 
Amount of direct foreign capital actually 
utilized (USD100 million) 
548 29252  177839  416001  820301  
Growth rate (%) -  5238% 508% 134% 97% 





Other important economic indicators to take into consideration analyzing the state of the 
economy of the city are the Total Investments in Fixed Assets that reached RMB 514.7 billion 
in 2019 and Total retail sales of consumer goods that valued RMB 601.6 billion in 2019.  
 
b. Level B – SIPI and MFP 
The literature shows that the Chinese growth model may be characterized by an inextricable 
relationship between the market and institutions, particularly the public sector. Shenzhen’s 
government adopted a flexible approach to boost the economy and promote competition; this 
methodology proved to be a valuable strategy for achieving growth. Shenzhen has been the 
very first Chinese Special Economic Zone created during the early period of modern China’s 
economic reforms and has been serving as China’s “window to the world” and “an 
experimentation field” ever since the nation’s opening up. The city development went through 
several stages, all of them characterized by a comprehensive series of institutional reforms and 
fiscal incentives. Shenzhen has assumed an exemplary role in driving China's progressive 
changes and urban remaking, which incorporate land, labor, financial, price and enterprise 
reforms. During the initial breakthrough stage, the municipal government promoted 
competition in design and construction for infrastructure, introducing a bidding system that 
changed permanently the old administrative allocation model (Zeng, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, with the price system reform in 1980, the city began to relax price controls on 
capital goods to ease constraints on pricing and fees on commodities in order to set up a 
mechanism in which commodity prices would have been imposed by the law of the supply and 
the demand. Other important reforms have been carried out by the Shenzhen government for 
the labor market, introducing procedures to determine employees’ wages and pension 
insurance. Shenzhen was the first city in China to allow foreign financial institutions and to 
privatize the financial system with two models for privatization; also, in 1990 the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and the first foreign exchange transaction center was established to encourage 
foreign capital inflows. The same year, with the reform of state-owned enterprises, Shenzhen 
allowed domestic and foreign investors to invest in former state-owned enterprises. Between 
1986 and 1991, Shenzhen reformed the administrative management system, simplifying it in 
three layers: comprehensive, administrative and asset management. During the same period, 
the government encouraged hi-tech entrepreneurship to invest in private enterprises by 
introducing incentives and promoting innovation in production. After 1997, the government 





increased the efficiency and role of the market in resource allocation, simplifying administrative 
procedures and increasing transparency to prevent corruption. Flexible reforms were 
implemented thanks to the special authority given to local officials by the central government. 
This allowed the opening up and dramatic growth of the city. Indeed, the central government 
not only pushed for system innovation, but it granted full recognition to innovative policies and 
adopted them on a national scale. Figure 7 illustrates government expenditure over 39 years by 
sector, fiscal stimulus for improvement of infrastructure, social institutions (Table 3 and 4) and 
industrialization through hi-tech industrial parks (Shenzhen Government Online, 2019).  
 
Figure 7. Government expenditure, 1979 - 2018 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
Table 3. Data on Education Intuitions 
Year 1979 1989 1999 2009 2018 
Education Insitutions (unit) 340 520 970 1626 2533 
 Students Enrolled (person) 65375 198549 466595 1222243 2142917 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
Table 4. Data on Health Care Institutions 
Year 1979 1989 1999 2009 2018 
Health Care Institutions (unit) 62 332 687 1963 3806 
Medical Personnel (person) 1214 7923 18841 67028 114882 
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The business environment is particularly attractive for investors as the Shenzhen SEZ enjoys 
tax exemptions, grant/loans, and reduced tax rates (Appendix: Table 5). Shenzhen’s proactive 
government has simplified the process for establishing companies, shortening the time to 
register a company from 20 working days to just one (Upton, 2019). Also, the city is the 
headquarters of seven Fortune Global 500 companies, namely: Ping An, Huawei, China 
Merchants Bank, Amer, Vanke, Tencent and Evergrand. The total volume of 3.05 million 
commercial entities in Shenzhen ranks it 1st in China in terms of the volume and density (Figure 
8), SMEs are promising to be the main source of innovation and their success is crucial for the 
country’s long-term growth.  
 
Figure 8. Total number of Enterprises in Shenzhen, 1979 – 2018 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
c. Level C – Innovation  
Drawing upon the literature, competition in the current context of globalization is increasingly 
innovation-based. Accordingly, Shenzhen is not only home for entrepreneurs (Figure 8) but 
also is a city conducive for startups and innovators. The city is the first Chinese international 
technology and industrial innovation center, with leading industries in Financial Technology, 
Electronic Information, High-end equipment manufacturing, Green and low-carbon and 
Biology (Shenzhen Government Online, 2019). Many of tech giants such as Huawei and 
Tencent established their headquarter in the ‘Silicon Valley’ of China, benefiting from the 












Total Number of Enterprises in Shenzhen, 1979 - 2018





talent. Due to the nature of the city, the average age of the population is 29 years. This facilitated 
ICT adoption and shifted consumer preferences towards an ever-greater green-smart city. The 
city also continuously leads in improvements of New Generation Technology such as: 
Integrated Circuits3, Artificial Intelligence, 5G Technology of mobile communication, IoT 4 and 
ICV5. Proxies for understanding the level of innovation can be the number of filed patents and 
R&D investments. In 2018, China filed 46,40% of the 3,326,300 world's total p atent 
applications (Figure 9), with Shenzhen increasing the number of applications by 29,1% from 
2017 to 228608 in 2018 (Figure 10). R&D investments, financing of enterprises self -raised 
funds and government appropriations reached ¥116 billion in 2018 (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 9. Total number of patent applications worldwide  
 
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, March 2020  
 
Figure 10. Number of Patent applications in Shenzhen, 1991 - 2018
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
 
3 Industrial ecosystem with synergies to support the upgrading of new generation information technology 
industry 
4 Internet of Things 
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Figure 11. Expenditure on R&D in Shenzhen, 2009 - 2018 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018   
 
Shenzhen’s leading position in terms of exports (Figure 5), is mainly due to the fact that the 
city is the world's hub for electronics manufacturing. For instance, Shenzhen is the first and 
largest hardware accelerator and manufacturing hub, attracting enormous amounts of freelance 
mechanical and electrical engineers. Another industry of interest for entrepreneurs and the local 
government is green and low-carbon ventures; trends towards energy conservation, 
environmental protection and the use of hydrogen fuel cell, helped the city to rank top in terms 
of air quality in China. In addition, its levels of energy and water consumption are the lowest 
among cities in the country, improving the entire industrial supply chain and continuously 
developing the hydrogen-based economy (UN-Habitat, 2019). Shenzhen’s position as an 
innovative and technological center helps businesses to flourish and remain competitive. The 
local administration optimizes, supervises and evaluates the city’s public infrastructure, 
security, financial and health systems. For instance, security is managed with the 159.09 
cameras per 1,000 people in the urban areas.  
  
3.4. Survey results  
 
The survey, distributed in the form of a questionnaire, was divided into two main sections: the 
first to test the competitiveness in Shenzhen, and the second part to gain insights regarding 
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a. First section – Shenzhen 
Respondents were asked to rate Shenzhen compared to other super cities like Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Suzhou, Beijing using 18 different indicators of the city's business environment 
that affect how well firms in Shenzhen can compete in the global marketplace. From the results, 
the city emerged as performing very well in almost all parameters relative to the peer group 
(Appendix; Table 6). Highlights of the data including positive ratings for Logistics (97,7%) and 
Communication (93,2%) infrastructures, confirming the positive trend of the economic 
variables analyzed. Furthermore, Shenzhen proved again to be a positive environment for 
entrepreneurs with respondents highly rating availability of capital for good quality ideas, ease 
of setting up new businesses, quality of suppliers, service providers, supporting institutions and 
availability of skilled labor all above average (Appendix; Table 6). In terms of innovation, 
95,5% of respondents valued the excellent innovation infrastructure and 72,7% rated above 
average the protection of physical and intellectual property rights. Furthermore, a positive 
evaluation was assigned also to the education system, including access to high‐quality 
education, good curricula that prepare students for productive and first-class universities. On 
the other hand, the quality of healthcare system and relative costs associated was rated in line 
with other first-tier cities, the efficiency of the legal framework and the complexity of the local 
tax code received ratings from a very small portion of respondents, with 36,4% of participants 
choosing the ‘Don’t know’ option and 79,5% rating these variables about average. In general, 
compared to other first tier cities, participants stated that Shenzhen’s business environment 
overall is 32% somewhat better than average and 59% much better than average. Overall, the 
data shows that the competitiveness of enterprises, based in Shenzhen, over the years has 
improved (93,2%).  
 
b. Second section – China  
Respondents were also asked to rate the Chinese business environment using the same set of 
18 indicators, but this time comparing China to the world’s other largest economies (Appendix; 
Table 6). Results are mostly consistent with the trends that emerged from the analysis of 
Shenzhen, However, the magnitude of each indicator tended to be smaller. For example, 
positive ratings for logistics and communication infrastructure for China were respectively, 
93% and 83,7% compared to 97,7% and 93,2% that resulted for Shenzhen. Context for 
entrepreneurship, strength of clusters and innovation infrastructure were evaluated above 





average, respectively with 86%, 83,7% and 81,4% positive ratings. Also, the availability for 
skilled labor produced an outcome somewhat better than average, with just 67,4% of positive 
ratings. Social infrastructure such as the education system, including the quality of universities 
were judged about average with all indicators yielding roughly 54,7% of positive and 45,3% 
negative responses, while the quality of health care has been rated somewhat worse than 
average (72%). With regard to the efficiency of the legal framework (62,8%), the effectiveness 
of regulations (44,2%) and the complexity of the national tax code (48,8%), participants rated 
all of aforementioned indicators about/worse than average, with a small proportion of 
respondents choosing the ‘Don’t know’ option. To conclude, participants overall think that the 
competitiveness of enterprises based in China is improving (93%) and that the business 
environment is keeping pace with the others advanced economies (50%) yet pulling ahead of 
emerging ones (71,7%).







The foregoing analysis aims to answer the research questions formulated in the introduction. 
We examined the dynamics that shaped the meteoric economic growth of China through the 
specific lens of a key city – Shenzhen – and we concluded that the major causal factors have 
been reforms opening up of the economy, government incentives, competitive dynamism, and 
ad hoc policies. Central and local government interaction, characterized by adaptive efficiency, 
has led cities, clusters and, in turn, the entire country towards an era of flourishing and has 
created a more market-based economy. But the state remains, nevertheless, an activist player 
in economic activity. GDP growth is a reasonable proxy for representing the country’s overall 
economic advancement (Appendix; Figure 12). Also, data on imports and exports shows the 
evolving relationship with foreign countries and global supply chains. Indeed, relaxed 
legislation, strategic incentives, technological innovation, and infrastructure creation stimulated 
inbound FDI and foreign entrepreneurs to invest and establish new SMEs in China.  
 
The best outcome of efficiency-enhancing reforms and competitive dynamics can be seen 
throughout the patterns of growth of the so-called ‘megacities’ of China. We looked at 
Shenzhen and its evolution over 40 years, as an illustrative explanatory phenomenon whereby 
relevant factors concerning China’s growth could be examined. Shenzhen’s population climbed 
from just 30,000 in the 1970s to over 12 million in 2019, the city is home for the first Special 
Economic Zone and today Shenzhen, together with the other cities of the Guangdong province, 
is the biggest contributor to Chinese GDP, with almost CN¥9 trillion (US$1.3 trillion) in 
contributions (2017) (Statista, 2019).  
 
But all that glitters is not gold; although China is implementing an economic miracle, nowadays 
it is facing major economic headwinds. Some negative aspects of the Chinese business 
environment, such as lack of transparency, an opaque legal system, the complexity of the 
national tax code, and the quality of social infrastructure, emerged as noteworthy constraints 
from the survey responses. In particular, several articles reproach China for promulgating 
suspicious and inaccurate data pertaining to various economic indicators such as GDP growth, 
company fundamentals, the level of NPLs in the banking sector and on infrastructure efficiency. 
For example, a report by the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School suggests that the 
Chinese construction system led to colossal waste producing cost overruns equal to one-third 





of China’s $28.2 trillion debt pile in 2014 (Browne, 2016). China’s inefficient infrastructure 
story and overcapacity challenges the conventional belief that to enhance economic growth you 
simply must build more, and thereby lower costs for businesses and households. To boost 
growth and rebalance the economy toward a consumption-based system running on equilibria 
between supply and demand, Beijing needs to rethink its model rather than continuing on a 
debt-driven building spree. This debt is concentrated in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which 
build much of the infrastructures. Ergo (2016) suggested that conventional tactics to stimulate 
growth through unchecked infrastructure spending, easy credit, and exports have become less 
effective and China needs to shift towards more structured and rational capital allocation to 
keep up with the ordinary pace of growth. A major problem for the country is also that the 
private debt-to-GDP ratio continues to rise increasing the chances of a debt crisis.  
 
Chinese economic growth is further slowing due to the problems in the banking industry. The 
growth of non-performing loans is said to be around 5-10%, which is way higher than the 1-
2% stated by Beijing.  The problem is that China relies on a rising debt funneled into non-
productive investments thereby allocating capital to any sector with capacity to absorb it rather 
than based on notions of capital efficiency and ROI.  The country’s long-term planning based 
on political considerations treats public sector spending as the sine qua non for success . 
Household income growth is fundamental for generating domestic demand and for transitioning 
the economy towards higher levels of domestic consumption.   
 
Strategies to solve the debt problem are not plausible as the amount posited by which 
productivity needs to rise is extremely unrealistic and requires high levels of economic 
efficiency. China’s problems are further compounded by the pandemic which brought 
production to a halt. Experts argue about whether China should keep investing in infrastructure, 
focusing on spending in rural areas to ease regional wealth disparities, along with well-designed 
social institutions (e.g.: hospitals and schools).  
 
Another issue that deserves attention is China’s economic aggression as it modernized its 
industrial base and sought to move up the global supply value chain. Beijing is investing heavily 
in technologies showing the world that they can compete as an innovation-led economy. Yet 
major economic powerhouses such as the US and EU accuse China of theft of IP, industrial 
espionage, unfair trade practices, rigging markets through anticompetitive practices and that 
much of its growth has been achieved in significant part through economic aggression. On one 





hand, China has been explicit and overt about its aggressive policies and practices such as 
protecting the domestic market from imports and competition while expanding its global market 
share and dominating traditional manufacturing industries. On the other hand, China has been 
blamed for a host of covert economic practices. The complete list of alleged aggressions can be 
found in Appendix, Table 6 (White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 2018).  
 
Finally, China has shown that it can promptly respond to stressors such as during the 2008 
financial crisis when China continued to grow while the rest of the world faced the Great 
Recession. Today, the COVID-pandemic crisis is the first-ever economic contraction on record 
(even though some analysts argue that the Chinese economy already contracted in 2015, even 
if the official numbers released January 2016 put GDP growth at 6.9% in 2015). In fact, China 
experienced a 9.8% contraction in GDP in the first quarter of 2020 due to depressed demand 
and the collapse in household income and corporate profits. However, researchers expect China 
to start showing signs of recovery around May. As a matter of fact, after an important 
deceleration in the first quarter, housing, infrastructure, industrial production, and imports -
exports sectors began to experience major improvements from April on (Browne, 2020).  
 
To get back on its feet as soon as possible, China will need to conduct policy loosening to 
enhance Total Social Financing to shore up the weak supply of credit that prevailed in February 
2020, so borrowing costs are lower, and SMEs can be supported. Consumption and demand 
collapsing and the loss of competitiveness in traditional manufacturing due to labor inflation 
and other factors will apply downward pressure on the trade surplus. Finally, an important 
change needed to accomplish liberalization of the capital account is to develop and reinforce 
the domestic financial system (Goldman Sachs, 2020). 
 
4.1. Directions for Future Research and Limitations 
 
It is undeniable that China experienced enormous economic growth and that today it is a global 
economic powerhouse. The World Bank estimates that a 1% decline in China’s growth shaves 
0.5% off global growth and slowdown in China puts significant downward pressure on 
commodity prices (Ergo, 2016). But history tells us, nations are not built on economic success 
and power alone. So how will China survive long-term? Future research should aim to answer 
this question and seek strategies to improve competitive dynamics beyond the state-market 
relationships. This means correcting economic distortions and lowering negative externalities 





such as debt burdens, wealth disparities, and toxic relationships with foreign countries. To 
conclude, it is important to state that this study is subject to limitations, especially regarding 
limited access to data and sample size. But the claims here do, nevertheless, broaden 
understanding and illuminate key factors associated with China’s astonishing economic growth. 
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Appendix – Figure 10 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2018 
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GDP trend in Shenzhen, 1979 - 2018







Appendix - Figure 12 
 





























































China's GDP, 1978-2018 





Appendix – Table 5
 
Source: China Briefing, 2019; Shenzhen Government Online, 2020 
 
 












Q1: Please select the 
option which describes 
your situation 
Total 
I live in China 72,6% 
I own a business in China, but I live abroad 3,0% 










1 Three to five-year tax exemptions for manufacturing and operating sites by high-tech enterprises
2 Five-year business tax exemptions for foreign banks
3 Value-added tax (VAT) and tariff exemptions for imported materials used for finished products
4 Equal living rates for foreigners and local citizens
5 Immunity from state quotas or permits for production
6 VAT exemption for goods made and sold locally
7 Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China
8 Certain Measures for Facilitation of the Development of Parallel-import Automobiles in Shenzhen Municipality
9 Issuance of the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for the Access of Foreign Investment (2019)
10 Several Policies and Measures of Further Expanding and Improving the Utilization of Foreign Capital (Revised)
11 Shenzhen Municipal Government policies to support enterprise competitiveness
12 Shenzhen Municipal Government offers preferential policies for headquarters companies
13 Shenzhen Municipal Government supporting policies for the promotion of innovation in science and technology















































Financial Services 13,3% 
Accounting 3,3% 
Professional Services 16,7% 
Scientific Services 3,3% 
Technical Services 1,7% 
Media: Broadcast, Film, and Multimedia 5,0% 
Media: Print and Publishing 0,0% 
Telecommunications 3,3% 
Data Processing 1,7% 
Construction 0,0% 
Real Estate 1,7% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 10,0% 
Manufacturing: Food and Beverage 1,7% 
Manufacturing: Textile and Apparel 0,0% 
Manufacturing: Wood, Paper, and Printing 0,0% 
Manufacturing: Petroleum, Chemicals, and Plastics 1,7% 
Manufacturing: Metal and Machinery 0,0% 
Manufacturing: Computer, Electrical, and Appliance 3,3% 
Other Manufacturing 0,0% 
Accommodation and Food Services 1,7% 
Health Care and Social Assistance 1,7% 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 5,0% 
Transportation and Logistics 1,7% 
Mining and Oil & Gas Extraction 0,0% 
Utilities 0,0% 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0,0% 
Educational Services 10,0% 
Other Services 6,7% 











 Private sector, for‐profit organization 82,7% 
Nonprofit organization 5,8% 




















Q5: How many people 
does your firm employ? 







   
Total 
  
Fewer than 5 10,0% 
5 to 9 5,0% 
10 to 19 5,0% 
20 to 49 8,3% 
50 to 99 11,7% 
100 to 249 8,3% 
250 to 499 10,0% 
500 to 999 11,7% 
1,000 to 2,499 10,0% 
2,500 to 4,999 3,3% 
5,000 to 9,999 1,7% 
10,000 or more 13,3% 



































Account Manager 1,7% 
Accountant 1,7% 
Analyst 1,7% 
Analyst  1,7% 
Assistant & physiatrist 1,7% 




Business Developer 1,7% 
Business man 1,7% 
Business Strategist 1,7% 
CEO 3,3% 
CIB 1,7% 
CMI Intern 1,7% 
Consultant 3,3% 
Consultant  3,3% 
Data Analyst 1,7% 
Data Analyst 1,7% 
Director 1,7% 
E - commerce specialist 1,7% 














































Full time employed 1,7% 
Global Product Management Intern  1,7% 
Industry Analyst 1,7% 
Intern  1,7% 
Internal Designer 1,7% 
International business development 1,7% 
Junior analyst 1,7% 
Legal Advisor 1,7% 
Letcturer 1,7% 
Marketing Assistant 1,7% 
Marketing Manager 1,7% 




Photographer and Videomaker 1,7% 
PMO 1,7% 
Professor 3,3% 
Project Management Intern 1,7% 
Real Estate Consultant 1,7% 
Sales Assistant 1,7% 
Sales Development Representative 1,7% 
Sales engineer  1,7% 
Sales Manager 3,3% 
Social Media Manager 1,7% 
Strategy Analyst 1,7% 
Trade Marketing Specialist 1,7% 







Q7: Does your firm have 











Q8: Does your firm have 





























































This section focuses on the 
competitiveness of the 
Shenzhen business 
environment. The next set 
of questions asks about 
various elements of the 
city's business 
environment, elements that 
affect how well firms in 
Total 
  
Much worse than average (Logistics infrastructure 
(High‐quality highways, railroads, ports, and air 
transport)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Logistics 
infrastructure (High‐quality highways, railroads, 
ports, and air transport)) 
0,0% 
About average (Logistics infrastructure (High‐quality 
highways, railroads, ports, and air transport)) 2,3% 
Somewhat better than average (Logistics 
infrastructure (High‐quality highways, railroads, 
ports, and air transport)) 
20,5% 
Much better than average (Logistics infrastructure 
(High‐quality highways, railroads, ports, and air 
transport)) 
77,3% 
Don’t know (Logistics infrastructure (High‐quality 
highways, railroads, ports, and air transport)) 0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
0,0% 





Shenzhen can compete in 
the global marketplace. 
For each element, please 
rate Shenzhen compared to 


















































Somewhat worse than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
0,0% 
About average (Communications infrastructure (High‐
quality and widely available telephony, Internet and 
data access)) 
6,8% 
Somewhat better than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
27,3% 
Much better than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
65,9% 
Don’t know (Communications infrastructure (High‐
quality and widely available telephony, Internet and 
data access)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Complexity of the local tax 
code) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Complexity of the 
local tax code) 2,3% 
About average (Complexity of the local tax code) 36,4% 
Somewhat better than average (Complexity of the 
local tax code) 25,0% 
Much better than average (Complexity of the local tax 
code) 20,5% 
Don’t know (Complexity of the local tax code) 15,9% 
   
Much worse than average (Education system through 
high school (Access to high‐quality education; 
curricula that prepare students for productive work)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Education system 
through high school (Access to high‐quality 
education; curricula that prepare students for 
productive work)) 
2,3% 
About average (Education system through high school 
(Access to high‐quality education; curricula that 
prepare students for productive work)) 
18,2% 



























































Somewhat better than average (Education system 
through high school (Access to high‐quality 
education; curricula that prepare students for 
productive work)) 
47,7% 
Much better than average (Education system through 
high school (Access to high‐quality education; 
curricula that prepare students for productive work)) 
29,5% 
Don’t know (Education system through high school 
(Access to high‐quality education; curricula that 
prepare students for productive work)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (High quality universities 
with strong linkages to the private sector) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (High quality 
universities with strong linkages to the private sector) 6,8% 
About average (High quality universities with strong 
linkages to the private sector) 15,9% 
Somewhat better than average (High quality 
universities with strong linkages to the private sector) 45,5% 
Much better than average (High quality universities 
with strong linkages to the private sector) 29,5% 
Don’t know (High quality universities with strong 
linkages to the private sector) 2,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
2,3% 
About average (Context for entrepreneurship 
(Availability of capital for high‐quality ideas; ease of 
setting up new businesses; lack of stigma for failure)) 
4,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
18,2% 





























Much better than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
72,7% 
Don’t know (Context for entrepreneurship 
(Availability of capital for high‐quality ideas; ease of 
setting up new businesses; lack of stigma for failure)) 
2,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 0,0% 
About average (Availability of skilled labor) 9,1% 
Somewhat better than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 65,9% 
Much better than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 20,5% 
Don’t know (Availability of skilled labor) 4,5% 
   
Much worse than average (Flexibility in hiring and 
firing of workers) 2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Flexibility in hiring 
and firing of workers) 2,3% 
About average (Flexibility in hiring and firing of 
workers) 52,3% 
Somewhat better than average (Flexibility in hiring 
and firing of workers) 20,5% 
Much better than average (Flexibility in hiring and 
firing of workers) 9,1% 
Don’t know (Flexibility in hiring and firing of 
workers) 13,6% 
   
Much worse than average (Innovation infrastructure 
(High‐quality scientific research institutions; 
availability of scientists and engineers)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Innovation 
infrastructure (High‐quality scientific research 
institutions; availability of scientists and engineers)) 
2,3% 
About average (Innovation infrastructure (High‐
quality scientific research institutions; availability of 
scientists and engineers)) 
2,3% 





Somewhat better than average (Innovation 
infrastructure (High‐quality scientific research 
institutions; availability of scientists and engineers)) 
11,4% 
Much better than average (Innovation infrastructure 
(High‐quality scientific research institutions; 
availability of scientists and engineers)) 
84,1% 
Don’t know (Innovation infrastructure (High‐quality 
scientific research institutions; availability of 
scientists and engineers)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Regulations (Effective and 
predictable regulations without unnecessary burden on 
firms)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Regulations (Effective 
and predictable regulations without unnecessary 
burden on firms)) 
2,3% 
About average (Regulations (Effective and predictable 
regulations without unnecessary burden on firms)) 25,0% 
Somewhat better than average (Regulations (Effective 
and predictable regulations without unnecessary 
burden on firms)) 
29,5% 
Much better than average (Regulations (Effective and 
predictable regulations without unnecessary burden on 
firms)) 
29,5% 
Don’t know (Regulations (Effective and predictable 
regulations without unnecessary burden on firms)) 13,6% 
   
Much worse than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
0,0% 





About average (Strength of cluster: Geographic 
concentrations of related firms, suppliers, service 
providers, and supporting institutions with effective 
collaboration) 
4,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
15,9% 
Much better than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
79,5% 
Don’t know (Strength of cluster: Geographic 
concentrations of related firms, suppliers, service 
providers, and supporting institutions with effective 
collaboration) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Quality of capital markets 
(Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; capital 
allocated to most profitable investments)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Quality of capital 
markets (Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; 
capital allocated to most profitable investments)) 
0,0% 
About average (Quality of capital markets (Ease of 
firm access to appropriate capital; capital allocated to 
most profitable investments)) 
4,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Quality of capital 
markets (Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; 
capital allocated to most profitable investments)) 
20,5% 
Much better than average (Quality of capital markets 
(Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; capital 
allocated to most profitable investments)) 
70,5% 
Don’t know (Quality of capital markets (Ease of firm 
access to appropriate capital; capital allocated to most 
profitable investments)) 
4,5% 
   





Much worse than average (Macroeconomic policy 
(Soundness of government budgetary and monetary 
policies)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Macroeconomic 
policy (Soundness of government budgetary and 
monetary policies)) 
2,3% 
About average (Macroeconomic policy (Soundness of 
government budgetary and monetary policies)) 18,2% 
Somewhat better than average (Macroeconomic 
policy (Soundness of government budgetary and 
monetary policies)) 
38,6% 
Much better than average (Macroeconomic policy 
(Soundness of government budgetary and monetary 
policies)) 
31,8% 
Don’t know (Macroeconomic policy (Soundness of 
government budgetary and monetary policies)) 9,1% 
   
Much worse than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
2,3% 
About average (Effectiveness of the political system 
(Ability of the government to pass effective laws)) 18,2% 
Somewhat better than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
31,8% 
Much better than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
34,1% 
Don’t know (Effectiveness of the political system 
(Ability of the government to pass effective laws)) 13,6% 
   
Much worse than average (Protection of physical and 
intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 0,0% 





Somewhat worse than average (Protection of physical 
and intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 4,5% 
About average (Protection of physical and intellectual 
property rights and lack of corruption) 20,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Protection of physical 
and intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 47,7% 
Much better than average (Protection of physical and 
intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 25,0% 
Don’t know (Protection of physical and intellectual 
property rights and lack of corruption) 2,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 0,0% 
About average (Efficiency of legal framework 
(Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 43,2% 
Somewhat better than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 25,0% 
Much better than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 11,4% 
Don’t know (Efficiency of legal framework (Modest 
legal costs; swift adjudication)) 20,5% 
   
Much worse than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
0,0% 





About average (Sophistication of firm management 
and operations (Use of sophisticated strategies, 
operating practices, management structures, and 
analytical techniques)) 
15,9% 
Somewhat better than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
50,0% 
Much better than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
27,3% 
Don’t know (Sophistication of firm management and 
operations (Use of sophisticated strategies, operating 
practices, management structures, and analytical 
techniques)) 
6,8% 
   
Much worse than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 6,8% 
About average (Quality of health care relative to cost) 45,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 25,0% 
Much better than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 15,9% 
Don’t know (Quality of health care relative to cost) 6,8% 





Q11: Compared to other 
first tier cities, would you 








Much worse than average 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average 2,3% 
About average 6,8% 
Somewhat better than average 31,8% 
Much better than average 59,1% 
Don’t know 0,0% 
 
  







Q12: Overall, do you think 
that the competitiveness of 
enterprises, based in 






Has Remained the Same 6,8% 





























This section focuses on the 
competitiveness of the 
Chinese business 
environment. The next set 
of questions asks about 
various elements of the 
country's business 
environment, elements that 
affect how well firms in 
China can compete in the 
global marketplace. For 
each element, please rate 
China compared to the 








Much worse than average (Logistics infrastructure 
(High‐quality highways, railroads, ports, and air 
transport)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Logistics 
infrastructure (High‐quality highways, railroads, 
ports, and air transport)) 
2,3% 
About average (Logistics infrastructure (High‐quality 
highways, railroads, ports, and air transport)) 4,7% 
Somewhat better than average (Logistics 
infrastructure (High‐quality highways, railroads, 
ports, and air transport)) 
25,6% 
Much better than average (Logistics infrastructure 
(High‐quality highways, railroads, ports, and air 
transport)) 
67,4% 
Don’t know (Logistics infrastructure (High‐quality 
highways, railroads, ports, and air transport)) 0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
2,3% 
About average (Communications infrastructure (High‐
quality and widely available telephony, Internet and 
data access)) 
11,6% 
Somewhat better than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
34,9% 



























































Much better than average (Communications 
infrastructure (High‐quality and widely available 
telephony, Internet and data access)) 
48,8% 
Don’t know (Communications infrastructure (High‐
quality and widely available telephony, Internet and 
data access)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Complexity of the national 
tax code) 2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Complexity of the 
national tax code) 4,7% 
About average (Complexity of the national tax code) 41,9% 
Somewhat better than average (Complexity of the 
national tax code) 25,6% 
Much better than average (Complexity of the national 
tax code) 16,3% 
Don’t know (Complexity of the national tax code) 9,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Education system through 
high school (Access to high‐quality education; 
curricula that prepare students for productive work)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Education system 
through high school (Access to high‐quality 
education; curricula that prepare students for 
productive work)) 
4,7% 
About average (Education system through high school 
(Access to high‐quality education; curricula that 
prepare students for productive work)) 
44,2% 
Somewhat better than average (Education system 
through high school (Access to high‐quality 
education; curricula that prepare students for 
productive work)) 
34,9% 
Much better than average (Education system through 
high school (Access to high‐quality education; 
curricula that prepare students for productive work)) 
16,3% 
Don’t know (Education system through high school 
(Access to high‐quality education; curricula that 
prepare students for productive work)) 
0,0% 


























































   
Much worse than average (High quality universities 
with strong linkages to the private sector) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (High quality 
universities with strong linkages to the private sector) 4,7% 
About average (High quality universities with strong 
linkages to the private sector) 37,2% 
Somewhat better than average (High quality 
universities with strong linkages to the private sector) 37,2% 
Much better than average (High quality universities 
with strong linkages to the private sector) 20,9% 
Don’t know (High quality universities with strong 
linkages to the private sector) 0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
4,7% 
About average (Context for entrepreneurship 
(Availability of capital for high‐quality ideas; ease of 
setting up new businesses; lack of stigma for failure)) 
7,0% 
Somewhat better than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
23,3% 
Much better than average (Context for 
entrepreneurship (Availability of capital for high‐
quality ideas; ease of setting up new businesses; lack 
of stigma for failure)) 
62,8% 
Don’t know (Context for entrepreneurship 
(Availability of capital for high‐quality ideas; ease of 
setting up new businesses; lack of stigma for failure)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 0,0% 


















Somewhat worse than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 4,7% 
About average (Availability of skilled labor) 25,6% 
Somewhat better than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 51,2% 
Much better than average (Availability of skilled 
labor) 16,3% 
Don’t know (Availability of skilled labor) 2,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Flexibility in hiring and 
firing of workers) 0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Flexibility in hiring 
and firing of workers) 4,7% 
About average (Flexibility in hiring and firing of 
workers) 48,8% 
Somewhat better than average (Flexibility in hiring 
and firing of workers) 23,3% 
Much better than average (Flexibility in hiring and 
firing of workers) 18,6% 
Don’t know (Flexibility in hiring and firing of 
workers) 4,7% 
   
Much worse than average (Innovation infrastructure 
(High‐quality scientific research institutions; 
availability of scientists and engineers)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Innovation 
infrastructure (High‐quality scientific research 
institutions; availability of scientists and engineers)) 
11,6% 
About average (Innovation infrastructure (High‐
quality scientific research institutions; availability of 
scientists and engineers)) 
7,0% 
Somewhat better than average (Innovation 
infrastructure (High‐quality scientific research 
institutions; availability of scientists and engineers)) 
20,9% 
Much better than average (Innovation infrastructure 
(High‐quality scientific research institutions; 
availability of scientists and engineers)) 
60,5% 





Don’t know (Innovation infrastructure (High‐quality 
scientific research institutions; availability of 
scientists and engineers)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Regulations (Effective and 
predictable regulations without unnecessary burden on 
firms)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Regulations (Effective 
and predictable regulations without unnecessary 
burden on firms)) 
4,7% 
About average (Regulations (Effective and predictable 
regulations without unnecessary burden on firms)) 37,2% 
Somewhat better than average (Regulations (Effective 
and predictable regulations without unnecessary 
burden on firms)) 
11,6% 
Much better than average (Regulations (Effective and 
predictable regulations without unnecessary burden on 
firms)) 
27,9% 
Don’t know (Regulations (Effective and predictable 
regulations without unnecessary burden on firms)) 16,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
4,7% 
About average (Strength of cluster: Geographic 
concentrations of related firms, suppliers, service 
providers, and supporting institutions with effective 
collaboration) 
11,6% 
Somewhat better than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
9,3% 





Much better than average (Strength of cluster: 
Geographic concentrations of related firms, suppliers, 
service providers, and supporting institutions with 
effective collaboration) 
74,4% 
Don’t know (Strength of cluster: Geographic 
concentrations of related firms, suppliers, service 
providers, and supporting institutions with effective 
collaboration) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Quality of capital markets 
(Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; capital 
allocated to most profitable investments)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Quality of capital 
markets (Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; 
capital allocated to most profitable investments)) 
7,0% 
About average (Quality of capital markets (Ease of 
firm access to appropriate capital; capital allocated to 
most profitable investments)) 
14,0% 
Somewhat better than average (Quality of capital 
markets (Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; 
capital allocated to most profitable investments)) 
18,6% 
Much better than average (Quality of capital markets 
(Ease of firm access to appropriate capital; capital 
allocated to most profitable investments)) 
58,1% 
Don’t know (Quality of capital markets (Ease of firm 
access to appropriate capital; capital allocated to most 
profitable investments)) 
0,0% 
   
Much worse than average (Macroeconomic policy 
(Soundness of government budgetary, interest rate and 
monetary policies)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Macroeconomic 
policy (Soundness of government budgetary, interest 
rate and monetary policies)) 
4,7% 





About average (Macroeconomic policy (Soundness of 
government budgetary, interest rate and monetary 
policies)) 
25,6% 
Somewhat better than average (Macroeconomic 
policy (Soundness of government budgetary, interest 
rate and monetary policies)) 
23,3% 
Much better than average (Macroeconomic policy 
(Soundness of government budgetary, interest rate and 
monetary policies)) 
27,9% 
Don’t know (Macroeconomic policy (Soundness of 
government budgetary, interest rate and monetary 
policies)) 
18,6% 
   
Much worse than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
7,0% 
About average (Effectiveness of the political system 
(Ability of the government to pass effective laws)) 25,6% 
Somewhat better than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
25,6% 
Much better than average (Effectiveness of the 
political system (Ability of the government to pass 
effective laws)) 
27,9% 
Don’t know (Effectiveness of the political system 
(Ability of the government to pass effective laws)) 11,6% 
   
Much worse than average (Protection of physical and 
intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Protection of physical 
and intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 7,0% 
About average (Protection of physical and intellectual 
property rights and lack of corruption) 34,9% 





Somewhat better than average (Protection of physical 
and intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 41,9% 
Much better than average (Protection of physical and 
intellectual property rights and lack of corruption) 9,3% 
Don’t know (Protection of physical and intellectual 
property rights and lack of corruption) 4,7% 
   
Much worse than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 11,6% 
About average (Efficiency of legal framework 
(Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 48,8% 
Somewhat better than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 9,3% 
Much better than average (Efficiency of legal 
framework (Modest legal costs; swift adjudication)) 4,7% 
Don’t know (Efficiency of legal framework (Modest 
legal costs; swift adjudication)) 23,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
0,0% 
Somewhat worse than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
2,3% 
About average (Sophistication of firm management 
and operations (Use of sophisticated strategies, 
operating practices, management structures, and 
analytical techniques)) 
25,6% 





Somewhat better than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
53,5% 
Much better than average (Sophistication of firm 
management and operations (Use of sophisticated 
strategies, operating practices, management structures, 
and analytical techniques)) 
16,3% 
Don’t know (Sophistication of firm management and 
operations (Use of sophisticated strategies, operating 
practices, management structures, and analytical 
techniques)) 
2,3% 
   
Much worse than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 2,3% 
Somewhat worse than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 23,3% 
About average (Quality of health care relative to cost) 46,5% 
Somewhat better than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 14,0% 
Much better than average (Quality of health care 
relative to cost) 11,6% 
Don’t know (Quality of health care relative to cost) 2,3% 
    
  
   
  
 
Q13: Overall, do you think 
that the competitiveness of 
enterprises, based in 





Has Remained the Same 4,7% 








Q14: Overall, over time is 




Falling behind (Other advanced economies like 
Western Europe, Japan, and the US) 8,7% 
Keeping pace (Other advanced economies like 
Western Europe, Japan, and the US) 50,0% 





behind, keeping pace with, 




Pulling ahead (Other advanced economies like 
Western Europe, Japan, and the US) 41,3% 
   
Falling behind (Emerging economies like Brazil, 
India, and Eastern Europe) 10,9% 
Keeping pace (Emerging economies like Brazil, India, 
and Eastern Europe) 17,4% 
Pulling ahead (Emerging economies like Brazil, India, 






Q15: Please think about 
firms operating in China 
— whether or not they are 
China‐owned. Overall, 
how successful are these 
firms at competing in the 
global marketplace against 





Not at all successful 0,0% 
Not very successful 4,3% 
Somewhat successful 21,7% 
Very successful 56,5% 
Extremely successful 17,4% 





Q16: Please think about 
firms operating in China 
— whether or not they are 
China‐owned. Overall, 
how successful are these 
firms at competing in the 
global marketplace against 
firms operating in other 
developing economies?  
Total 
  
Not at all successful 0,0% 
Not very successful 0,0% 
Somewhat successful 21,7% 
Very successful 37,0% 
Extremely successful 39,1% 





Q17: Five years from now, 
do you expect the ability 
of firms operating in China 
to compete successfully in 




Much worse than today 0,0% 
Somewhat worse 6,5% 
The same 4,3% 
Somewhat better 52,2% 
Much better than today 37,0% 












Q18: Five years from now, 
do you expect firms 




Much less able to support high wages and benefits 0,0% 
Somewhat less able 4,3% 
Neither less nor more able 2,2% 
Somewhat more able 58,7% 
Much more able to support high wages and benefits 32,6% 
Don’t know 2,2% 
 
Source: Author, 2020 
